Quarterly Economic Commentary Spring 2020 by McQuinn, Kieran et al.
QUARTERLY ECONOMIC COMMENTARY
SPRING 2020
KIERAN MCQUINN, CONOR O'TOOLE, MATTHEW ALLEN-COGHLAN AND 
CATHAL COFFEY
MACRO 
ECONOMIC 
FORECASTING
MARCH 2020 
EV
IDE
NCE FOR POLICY
  
 
QUARTERLY ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
 
 
 
Kieran McQuinn 
Conor O’Toole 
Matthew Allen-Coghlan 
Cathal Coffey 
 
 
Spring 2020 
The forecasts in this Commentary are based on data available by 19 March 2020 
Draft completed on 19 March 2020 
 
A subscription to the Quarterly Economic Commentary costs €327 per year, 
including VAT and postage. 
 
© The Economic and Social Research Institute,  
Whitaker Square, Sir John Rogerson’s Quay, Dublin 2. 
 
ISBN 978-0-7070-0518-8 
ISSN 0376-7191 
DOI https://doi.org/10.26504/qec2020spr 
 
 
This Open Access work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and 
reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly credited.   
ABOUT THE ESRI   
The Economic and Social Research Institute is an independent research institute 
working towards a vision of ‘Informed policy for a better Ireland’. The ESRI seeks 
to support sustainable economic growth and social progress in Ireland by providing 
a robust knowledge base capable of providing effective solutions to public policy 
challenges.  
 
The Institute was founded in 1960 by a group of senior civil servants, led by  
Dr T.K. Whitaker, who identified the need for independent and in-depth research 
to support the policymaking process in Ireland. Since then, the Institute has 
remained committed to independent research and its work is free of any expressed 
ideology or political position. The Institute publishes all research reaching the 
appropriate academic standard, irrespective of its findings or who funds the 
research.  
 
The ESRI brings together leading experts from a variety of disciplines who work 
together to break new ground across a number of research initiatives. The 
expertise of its researchers is recognised in public life and researchers are 
represented on the boards and advisory committees of several national and 
international organisations. 
 
ESRI researchers uphold the highest academic standards. The quality of the 
Institute’s research output is guaranteed by a rigorous peer review process. 
Research is published only when it meets the required standards and practices. 
Research quality has also been assessed as part of two peer reviews of the 
Institute, in 2010 and 2016.  
 
ESRI research findings are disseminated widely in books, journal articles and 
reports. Reports published by the ESRI are available to download, free of charge, 
from its website. ESRI staff members communicate research findings at regular 
conferences and seminars, which provide a platform for representatives from 
government, civil society and academia to discuss key findings from recently 
published studies and ongoing research.  
 
The ESRI is a company limited by guarantee, answerable to its members and 
governed by a Council, comprising a minimum of 11 members and a maximum of 
14 members, who represent a cross-section of ESRI members: academia, civil 
service, state agencies, businesses and civil society.  
  
THE AUTHORS 
The Commentary is edited by Kieran McQuinn and Conor O’Toole. Kieran McQuinn 
is Research Professor and Conor O’Toole is a Senior Research Officer at the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI). Matthew Allen-Coghlan and Cathal 
Coffey are Research Assistants at the ESRI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Quarterly Economic Commentary has been accepted for publication by the Institute, which does 
not itself take institutional policy positions. It has been peer reviewed by ESRI research colleagues prior 
to publication. The authors are solely responsible for the content and the views expressed. 
 
  Q uarter ly  E conomic  Commentary  –  Spr ing  2020 |i  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Summary Table ......................................................................................................................... i 
 
CHAPTERS 
The Irish Economy – Forecast Overview ................................................................................... 1 
The Domestic Economy ........................................................................................................... 3 
General Assessment .............................................................................................................. 13 
 
  
 
  
i i  |  Q uarter ly  E conomic  Commentary  –  Spr ing  2020    
 
 
SCENARIO RESULTS SUMMARY TABLE 
  2017 2018 2019 2020 
Output (Real Annual Growth %)         
Private Consumer Expenditure 3.0 3.4 2.8 -3.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 3.9 4.4 5.6 6.5 
Investment -6.8 -21.1 94.1 -8.1 
Exports 9.2 10.4 11.1 -5.0 
Imports 1.1 -2.9 35.6 -3.6 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 8.1 8.2 5.5 -7.1 
Gross National Product (GNP) 5.2 6.5 3.3 -8.1 
          
Labour Market         
Employment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 2,194 2,258 2,322 2,145 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (‘000)) 158 137 121 307 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 6.7 5.8 5.0 12.6 
          
Public Finance         
General Government Balance (€bn) -0.9 0.2 1.4 -12.7 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) -0.3 0.1 0.4 -4.3 
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The Irish Economy – Overview 
 
COVID-19 poses the single largest challenge to the Irish economy since the financial 
crisis. 
 
The response of authorities both domestically and internationally to the spread of 
the virus, while absolutely necessary from a general health perspective, will result 
in millions of jobs being lost globally in the coming weeks and months and a sharp 
contraction in global economic activity. The limitations on international travel and 
the effective sealing-off of entire countries will have profound implications for 
cross-country trade and commerce. 
 
The swiftness of the economic deterioration is unprecedented in modern times 
and in many respects exceeds that of the financial crisis. 
 
It is clear that both monetary and fiscal authorities across the globe must act with 
conviction and speed to smooth the economic and financial effects of the crisis. 
Fiscal authorities must support the income levels of those made unemployed and 
ensure that those commercial enterprises financially viable prior to the crisis are 
able to operate after it.  
 
The European Central Bank (ECB) will have a key role to play in both stabilising debt 
markets in the short run in response to the increased fiscal pressures on member 
states, and in mitigating the effects of the crisis on economic growth in the months 
and years to come. This may require an extensive expansion of the ECB’s balance 
sheet.  
 
Given the unprecedented uncertainty concerning the virus, we conduct a scenario 
analysis as opposed to a traditional forecast. Mainly through demand-side 
channels, we examine the impact of the current restrictions on economic life on 
the assumption that the restrictions are in place over a period of 12 weeks. Under 
such a scenario, the domestic economy would register a recession in this year with 
output contracting by 7.1 per cent. This constitutes a significant reversal of the pre-
COVID-19 related economic trends. 
 
Crucially, this scenario assumes that economic activity both domestically and 
internationally begins to recover significantly in Q3 and Q4 of the present year. If 
this does not occur, then the results will be even more adverse for the domestic 
economy. 
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All sources of growth such as consumption, investment and exports are 
substantially impacted under the scenario. 
 
Under the scenario, the unemployment rate is set to increase significantly with the 
rate increasing from 4.8 per cent in February to 18 per cent in Q2 2020 before 
falling back to just under 11 per cent by the end of the year. This speed of change 
in the fortunes of the domestic and international labour markets is unprecedented. 
 
Consequently, there will be significant pressure on the Irish public finances. The 
combination of the extra expenditure on health and social welfare allied to the 
sharp decline in certain taxation revenues means a deficit of nearly 4.5 per cent is 
now likely to occur in 2020 and could be higher. Greater expenditure may still be 
required in order to meet this threat to public health. 
 
The path to recovery for the Irish economy is complicated by its extremely open 
nature. While the domestic authorities may be successful in limiting the spread of 
the virus, the performance and recovery of the Irish economy will now also depend 
on the effectiveness with which other countries deal with COVID-19.  
 
It is clear that a coordinated response across the European institutions is required 
to address the economic fall-out from dealing with the virus. In particular, lessons 
must be learned from the manner in which European institutions dealt with the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. Beyond a European context, the global economic 
shock is going to require extensive, coordinated fiscal and monetary expansion to 
mitigate the effects of the economic shock.  
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The Domestic Economy 
 
OUTPUT 
Our approach to assessing the impact of the COVID-19 virus on the Irish economy 
is to conduct a scenario analysis where we focus on the demand-side implications 
of the measures introduced by the Government to contain the spread of the virus. 
Before the onset of the virus, in early 2020 we had believed the economy could 
grow by up to 4 per cent in the current year.  
 
Based on a framework in Keogh-Brown et al. (2010),1 we conduct a detailed 
analysis of the impact of the virus on consumption levels. In particular, we examine 
the impacts of a 12-week pandemic period where the current restrictions and 
closures on economic and social life remain in place. Our key working assumption 
is that the majority of the economic impacts of the virus occur in Q2 of the present 
year. By Q3 and into Q4, economic activity both domestically and internationally is 
assumed to return to normal.  
 
We also conduct a similar exercise for exports and imports. Separately, we evaluate 
the economic impacts of the virus pandemic on investment, the labour market and 
the public finances. Under the scenario, the domestic economy contracts by over 
7 per cent in 2020. The unemployment rate, under the scenario, jumps to 18 per 
cent in Q2 before falling back for the rest of year, to just under 11 per cent by the 
end of the year. The resulting pressure on the public finances results in a deficit of 
nearly 4.5 per cent of GDP. While these economic impacts are severe, if the impacts 
of the virus persist on a significant basis into the second half of the year, the 
adverse effects will be even greater. 
 
In the following sections we outline the effects of our scenario analysis on 
household demand, the traded sector, investment, the labour market and finally 
the public finances. 
 
DEMAND 
Household sector consumption  
Understanding the path of consumption in Ireland over the coming year has 
become increasingly challenging due to the outbreak of COVID-19. During periods 
of economic disruption caused by disease outbreaks, households often react by 
 
 
 
1  Keogh-Brown, M.R., S. Wren-Lewis, W.J. Edmunds, P. Beutels and R.D. Smith (2010). ‘The possible macroeconomic 
impact on the UK of an influenza pandemic’, Health Economics, Vol. 19, Issue 11, p. 1345-1360. 
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cutting back on discretionary consumption and increasing precautionary savings. 
Give the suddenness of this shock, its global reach and scale, as well as the strict 
administrative restrictions on social and economic activity, parameterising the 
likely economic impact is exceptionally difficult. The dramatic and instantaneous 
rise in unemployment and cuts to income for households remaining in employment 
will reduce expenditure sharply. In such a scenario, any analysis based on historical 
experience may underestimate the initial economic impact on household 
spending.  
 
During a pandemic, households pull back on spending for a number of reasons. 
First, households become unemployed and spending falls; second, other 
households reduce discretionary spending by avoiding situations that may increase 
the likelihood of infection. Precautionary savings (to buffer any future shock) are 
also likely to rise. Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) present some scenarios as to how 
consumption patterns may change during a pandemic. These are parameterised 
from population-based survey data which leverage information from Sadique el al. 
(2007).2 The method goes through a range of household spending items and 
discusses the extent to which this spending is foregone during the pandemic. 
Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) note that 75 per cent of households would avoid making 
purchases in the area of leisure, transport, furnishings, clothes, cars and tourism. 
They assume the losses to transport and leisure will not be made up but spending 
on furnishings, clothes, cars and tourism are likely to be deferred rather than lost 
altogether.  
 
However, these studies assume that the economy remains, to a large extent, fully 
functioning with the only new frictions due to school closures and adjustments to 
the labour force. Given the experience with the COVID-19 pandemic in other 
countries (notably China, Italy and France), and the measures around business and 
educational institutional closures announced in Ireland to date, these influenza 
studies are unlikely to sufficiently capture the shock to Irish spending. This is due 
to the extensive closure of businesses and services on public health grounds.  
 
Therefore, to give some insight into the scale of the economic shock to household 
spending, we undertake a static exercise using the Household Budget Survey (HBS) 
data from 2015, to explore by how much Irish consumption may fall if (on average) 
households were to adjust their spending in line with a shock that we entitle the 
’12-week shutdown scenario’.  
 
 
 
 
2  Sadique, M., W.J. Edmunds et al. (2007). ‘Precautionary Behavior in Response to Perceived Threat of Pandemic 
Influenza’. Emerging Infectious Diseases, 13(9): 1307-1313. 
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The average expenditure by Irish households across broad categories from the HBS 
is presented below. A majority of spending is accounted for by housing costs and 
miscellaneous expenditure and food purchased at home.  
 
TABLE 1 IRISH HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
 Average Spend per 
Week (€) 
% of Total 
Total food consumed at home 97.01 12 
Meals away from home (incl. takeout tea/coffee) 26.27 3 
Drink consumed at home 10.56 1 
Drink consumed out 10.06 1 
Tobacco 7.39 1 
Clothing and footwear 33.65 4 
Fuel and light 38.56 5 
Housing costs 164.36 20 
Household non-durable goods 16.51 2 
Household durable goods 27.50 3 
Vehicles (net of trade-in) 46.89 6 
Motor Fuel 34.88 4 
Insurance, tax and fines 22.14 3 
Vehicle maintenance and other costs 12.22 1 
Bus, Luas, rail and taxi 6.68 1 
Delivery charges (takeaways) and other transport services 0.14 0 
Air travel within ROI 0.00 0 
International air travel 1.30 0 
Other purchased transport services 0.14 0 
Total miscellaneous goods, services and other expenditure 281.21 34 
Total 837.47 100 
 
Source: Household Budget Survey, CSO. 
 
In the economic scenario, we go through the spending items for the average 
household and adjust the spending downward in line with a judgement-based 
assessment of how spending might react in a shutdown. While we use Keogh-
Brown et al. (2010) and Sadique el al. (2007) to provide guidance, the realities of 
the current scenario have led us to adjust these assessments accordingly. The 
mechanics of our scenario are as follows:3  
 
Pandemic period  
For a 12-week pandemic period, we apply the following changes to spending: 
 
 
 
3  For brevity, we do not show the full mappings. However, these are available on request from the authors.  
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• Expenditure on food and drink at home and medical care is doubled; 
• Spending on housing costs, fuel and light, insurance, telecommunications, 
internet, other utilities, education expenditure (given fees etc. are already 
paid), home help, charitable donations, maintenance payments, elderly care 
costs and baby equipment are all kept constant;  
• All other spending is set to zero.  
 
Given the stringent administrative controls on activity, we do not see this as 
extreme. The doubling of food and drink and medical expenses reflects a number 
of factors including the administrative closure of services providing non-home 
based food and drink, precautionary expenditure and excess goods hoarding (panic 
buying) as well as treatment for illness.  
 
Recovery period  
For the 12-week period following the end of the public health emergency, we 
assume the following: 
• Food and drink at home and medical expenses return to normal spending 
patterns; 
• Items for which the purchase was not time-specific – related to a journey or 
leisure, sporting or social activity – we assume that spending for this item 
recovers by 50 per cent; thus we project spending at 1.5 times higher than 
normal for 12 weeks. The items included in this are: spending on clothing and 
footwear; durable and non-durable goods (broadly defined by HBS categories); 
spending on vehicles and their maintenance; repair of personal items; catering 
for weddings etc. Selection of these categories was based on judgement; 
attempting to understand what spending households would forego as 
opposed to postpone;  
• All other items return to normal.  
 
The weekly spending profiles under these three scenarios are presented below: 
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TABLE 2 WEEKLY SPENDING PROFILE  
 Normal 
Week 
Pandemic 
Week 
Recovery 
Week 
Total food consumed at home 97.01 194.02 97.01 
Meals away from home (incl. takeout tea/coffee) 26.27 0.00 26.27 
Drink consumed at home 10.56 21.12 10.56 
Drink consumed out 10.06 0.00 10.06 
Tobacco 7.39 7.39 7.39 
Clothing and footwear 33.65 0.00 50.48 
Fuel and light 38.56 38.56 38.56 
Housing costs 164.36 164.36 164.36 
Household non-durable goods 16.51 0.00 24.77 
Household durable goods 27.50 0.00 41.25 
Vehicles (net of trade-in) 46.89 0.00 70.34 
Motor Fuel 34.88 0.00 34.88 
Insurance, tax and fines 22.14 22.14 22.14 
Vehicle maintenance and other costs 12.22 0.00 18.33 
Bus, Luas, rail and taxi 6.68 0.00 6.68 
Delivery charges (takeaways) and other transport 
services 
0.14 0.00 0.14 
Air travel within ROI 0.00 0.00 0.00 
International air travel 1.30 0.00 1.30 
Other purchased transport services 0.14 0.00 0.14 
Total miscellaneous goods, services and other 
expenditure4 
281.17 183.96 289.56 
Total 837.43 631.55 914.20 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The scenario implies that household spending is 25 per cent lower during the 
pandemic than normal, but recovers to 9 per cent above normal following the 
pandemic to account for the return of postponed spending.  
 
Using these data we apply the following calculation. For a full calendar year  
(52 weeks), we apply pandemic spending levels for a 12-week period; recovery 
spending for a 12-week period; and for the remaining 28 weeks expenditure is 
normal. 
 
 The overall annual impact on consumption is therefore -4 per cent with the 
recovery in spending in the 12 weeks following the pandemic. Without the 
recovery, spending falls by a further 2 percentage points to -6 per cent.  
 
 
 
4  Mappings for this category are available on request.  
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TABLE 3 PANDEMIC IMPACT ON CONSUMPTION  
  Spending (€) Change % 
Base Case 43,548  
12 Week (No Recovery) 41,077 -6% 
12 Week (Recovery) 41,998 -4% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
TRADED SECTOR 
As a result of the rapid global spread of the COVID-19 virus, all of Ireland’s major 
trading partners have been/will be impacted in a major way by the pandemic. 
Given the variation in which the speed of the virus has spread through each country 
and the disparity in policy responses that governments have made, the pandemic 
is likely to peak at different points in time in each country throughout the year. This 
means the impact of COVID-19 on Irish trade may be spread out over a longer time 
period than its impact on other components of Irish GDP. However, in light of the 
current uncertainty regarding when the virus is expected to peak, we follow our 
baseline assumption for the other components of GDP and assume that the virus 
has a one quarter impact on Irish exports and imports, and that trade returns to 
normal in the following quarter.  
 
The disruption the virus causes to the economies of all of Ireland’s major trading 
partners will significantly reduce consumption and business investment in these 
economies which in turn will result in a large fall in Irish exports. However, some 
components of Irish exports are likely to be more impacted than others with 
machinery and equipment and business services likely to be particularly hard hit as 
a result of the fall in global investment. The fall in consumption and restrictions on 
international air travel also mean that tourism is likely to collapse over the quarter. 
Other less cyclical exports such as medicinal and pharmaceutical products are likely 
to be more resilient and, in some cases, may benefit from increased demand for 
medical supplies. Overall, under the scenario Irish exports fall by 5.0 per cent in 
2020. As per the impact of COVID-19 on domestic consumption and investment, 
imports are also likely to decline significantly this year. Again, ‘machinery and 
equipment’ is likely to take a significant hit as are business services. Imports for the 
year, therefore, decline by 3.6 per cent under the scenario.  
 
INVESTMENT 
Investment expenditure by enterprises has two distinct features that make it more 
likely to adjust rapidly to the current COVID-19 outbreak. First, expenditure on 
Q uarter ly  E conomic  Commentary  –  Spr ing  2020 | 9  
 
fixed capital is irreversible (other than re-sale of the assets) and second, it is highly 
dependent on companies’ expectations for future revenue streams. In the current 
environment, with an immediate and sharp adjustment in aggregate demand from 
households and firms, and an exceptionally high degree of uncertainty about the 
future trading landscape, it is likely that companies will pare back investment 
significantly. Furthermore, given the administrative controls introduced for public 
health reasons, physical barriers to undertaking investment will also be present for 
the duration of the outbreak.  
 
However, the degree to which investment will recover will be highly dependent on 
the duration and scale of the public health crisis. In previous simulations of 
pandemic scenarios, Keogh-Brown et al. (2010) simulate that while investment 
drops during the pandemic, it fully recovers in the quarter afterwards. The scale of 
the current crisis may lead this to be too benign a scenario. We therefore make the 
following adjustments to investment spending, taking into account that the 
rebound in the following quarter is unlikely to entirely make up for the loss in the 
impacted quarter: 
• Dwellings – investment falls to zero for the period but an 80 per cent rebound 
occurs;5 
• Improvements – households cut spending to zero in the quarter and an 80 per 
cent rebound occurs;  
• Other building and construction – investment to fall by 50 per cent, and half of 
the lost investment is recovered; 
• Transfer costs are unchanged; 
• Machinery and equipment and R&D – all investment stops for the quarter with 
50 per cent of the lost investment being made up in the following quarter (net 
loss of 50 per cent of one quarter).  
 
The impacts are presented (for a full year) in Table 4.  
 
 
 
 
5  For investment in dwellings and improvements, our net loss is calibrated to be proportionate to the labour market 
shock facing households. Given that we predict an unemployment rate of close to 20 per cent in the quarter, we 
parameterise the scenario net loss as 20 per cent for investment in dwellings and improvements.  
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TABLE 4 PANDEMIC IMPACT ON INVESTMENT  
  
Base Case 
(€million) 
With One Quarter 
Pandemic  
(€ million) 
Change 
% 
Modified Gross Domestic Fixed Capital 
Formation 
39,528 36,290 -8.2 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation – 
Dwellings 
4,511 4,285 -5.0 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation – 
Improvements 
2,687 2,553 -5.0 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation – 
Other Building and Construction 
15,965 14,967 -6.3 
Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation – 
Transfer Costs 
1,324 1,324 0.0 
Machinery and equipment and R&D 15,041 13,161 -12.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Investment in other buildings and construction, which primarily relates to 
commercial building, falls in the impacted quarter by about half of what it would 
be in the base case. However, in the following quarter about half of this loss is 
recovered leading to an annualised loss of 6.3 per cent. Under the scenario, 
investment in dwellings and improvements comes to a complete halt in the quarter 
of the pandemic but much of this investment is then deferred to the following 
quarter offsetting a significant amount of the original loss. The annual loss of 
investment in dwellings and improvements is estimated to be 5.0 per cent.  
A similar scenario is estimated for other machinery and equipment and R&D with 
a complete fall in investment during the pandemic quarter, though less of the 
investment is made up in the next quarter. Investment in these items is forecast to 
fall by 12.5 per cent on an annual basis. Investment related to transfer costs is not 
forecast to be impacted by the pandemic. Overall, under our scenario, investment 
is down 8.1 per cent for 2020 compared to the previous year. 
 
LABOUR MARKET AND PUBLIC FINANCES 
Labour market results 
An inevitable consequence of the decision taken by the authorities to restrict the 
spread of the virus has been an almost total decline in certain types of economic 
activity from mid-March onwards. Many outlets particularly in the retail, food and 
hospitality sectors have simply stopped trading. Under our scenario we assume a 
12-week period during which the restrictions and controls on public life continue. 
This will inevitably result in a dramatic increase in the numbers of workers in these 
sectors being made unemployed. In particular, the wholesale and retail trade and 
the accommodation and food service activities, which together employed over 
480,000 people in Q1 2020, look set to lose a substantial number of workers over 
a very short period of time. While the domestic labour market experienced a rapid 
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increase in unemployment in the period between early 2008 and 2009 (from  
5.3 per cent to 14 per cent), such an increase in the present context could take 
place in a matter of weeks. 
 
Under our scenario, we assume that normal economic activity both domestically 
and internationally will have commenced by Q3 of the present year. Overall, the 
unemployment rate increases from 4.8 per cent in Q1 to 18 per cent in Q2 before 
falling back to 16.5 per cent in Q3 and 10.7 per cent in Q4. The increase in the 
unemployment rate through Q2 and Q3 is equivalent to approximately 300,000 
workers losing their jobs during this period. Under our scenario we also assume 
that net migration into Ireland declines significantly during the course of 2020. 
 
Clearly, policy interventions that ensure inherently viable businesses survive the 
crisis, and that secure income levels for those households most affected, will lower 
the impact of the crisis on the labour market. However, the increase in 
unemployment could be greater if economic activity does not return to normal in 
the latter half of the year.  
 
Public finance results 
Given the impacts of COVID-19 on consumption, trade and the labour market in 
our scenario, it is evident that certain tax headings such as income tax, VAT, 
corporation taxes and PRSI receipts are all likely to experience significant declines 
in 2020. The substantial increase in unemployment in Q2 inevitably results in a 
dramatic fall-off in revenues across a number of tax headings for that quarter. 
Under the scenario, for example, total receipts for income tax fall by 5 per cent in 
the present year, with VAT receipts also declining by 8 per cent. The decline in 
income taxation receipts is consistent with our scenario results for the labour 
market, while the decline in VAT receipts reflects the sharp decline in consumption 
detailed above. Overall, under the scenario, taxation receipts are reduced by 
almost 7 per cent. This is in sharp contrast to recent trends in taxation receipts. 
 
Similarly, on the expenditure side, the Government has committed significant 
additional resources to addressing the outbreak of the virus. We assume that the 
funds which had been set aside to deal with a hard Brexit (approximately  
€1.2 billion) are now fully spent on virus-related measures as well as additional 
revenues publicly pledged. Also, the sharp increase in unemployment will result in 
a sizeable increase in transfer payments. Based on our results for the labour 
market, upwards of €2 billion in such payments are now required in 2020.6  
 
 
 
6  We are particularly grateful to our colleagues Karina Doorley and Barra Roantree for providing us with this estimate 
based on the SWITCH model. 
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We also include the cost of an income protection scheme similar to that proposed 
in the United Kingdom. Under such a scheme 80 per cent of the salary of workers 
made redundant during the virus crisis would be paid by the national Exchequer. 
On top of the regular transfer payment, we estimate this would result in an 
additional €2.8 billion expenditure over the period in question. When we combine 
this with the lower revenues on the taxation side, it results in a deficit for 2020 of 
over 4 per cent for the year.  
 
It may be necessary to increase the deficit beyond this amount if additional health 
expenditure and/or social welfare payments are required. Additional expenditure 
may also be required to fund a broadly-based stimulus when economic activity 
recommences in Q3 and Q4. Obviously, if there is a significant delay in the 
economic recovery both globally and domestically, then the size of this deficit 
would also increase as the year progresses. 
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General Assessment 
 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COVID-19: 
Ultimately, in order to contain the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the public 
authorities have had to implement measures which will have a drastic impact on 
certain aspects of economic activity. In that regard it is important also to note that, 
for once, Government policy is actively seeking to limit certain aspects of economic 
activity. Part of the necessary action taken by the authorities involves closing 
schools, pubs, restaurants, hotels and limiting the use of airports. All of this 
significantly curtails what Wren-Lewis7 calls ‘social consumption’.  
 
This will inevitably result in a significant decline in output in key sectors of the 
economy with a significant increase in unemployment. The likely increase in Irish 
unemployment will be substantial in size and rapid in nature. To provide some 
perspective, at the height of the financial crisis Irish unemployment went from  
5.3 per cent in February 2008 to almost 14 per cent in September 2009. This time 
around, the unemployment rate could increase to 18 per cent in Q2 of this year 
from its rate in February of 4.8 per cent. If economic activity does begin to return 
to normal in Q3 and Q4, the unemployment rate declines through the rest of the 
year from 16.5 per cent in Q3 to 10.7 per cent in Q4. 
 
Given the uncertainty around the duration of the virus it is not possible to produce 
accurate forecasts at a time like this. In estimating the economic effect of the virus, 
our approach is to conduct scenario analysis as opposed to a traditional forecast. 
Also, given the rapidly changing nature of the pandemic, it is likely that even well 
thought out scenarios can quickly become out of date. Therefore, we will produce 
a range of scenarios and economic updates over the coming months as more 
information becomes available concerning the scale and impact of the pandemic.  
 
We begin by providing a specific scenario which considers the impact on the Irish 
economy of a continuation of the current restrictions and controls on economic 
and social life for a 12-week period. On an annualised basis, we believe 
consumption could decline by almost 4 per cent relative to 2019 levels under such 
a 12-week pandemic period. We combine these impacts on consumption along 
with impacts on trade and on investment. These results indicate that the Irish 
economy is almost certainly heading for a significant contraction in 2020.  
 
 
 
 
7  Wren-Lewis defines consumption as social if it helps bring people into contact with other people. See 
https://mainlymacro.blogspot.com/2020/03/the-economic-effects-of-pandemic.html for more on this. 
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It is important to acknowledge the assumptions made in this exercise. These 
include the expectation that most major economies will have managed to contain 
the virus by July, and that normal economic activity will recommence during the 
latter two quarters of the year. If this does not happen then the impact on the Irish 
economy will be even more severe. 
 
Under our scenario, key fiscal metrics for the economy will be adversely impacted. 
While a surplus had looked likely at the onset of the year, the knock-on impact of 
lower taxation revenues coupled with greater than expected public expenditure on 
health and social welfare means that a deficit of at least 4.3 per cent is now likely 
in the public finances.  
 
THE POLICY RESPONSE TO COVID-19: 
While the most pressing policy concern at present is to introduce whatever 
measures are required to stem the spread of the virus, policies to stabilise the 
economic fallout are also critical from an economic and human perspective. The 
overarching policy concern should be twofold: protecting household incomes and 
ensuring businesses can survive the pandemic period and remain viable in the 
aftermath.  
 
While the financial crisis and the current situation are very different, one lesson 
from the previous period should guide policy choices now. It is clear that 
households and firms with high debt levels cut back on consumption, investment 
and employment. If businesses, in particular, are to maintain employment and 
return to growth when the acute medical phase of the current crisis has abated, 
policies should be focused on helping these enterprises to manage their payments 
and cash flow without running up significant debt levels. Supports to protect 
workers’ incomes can have a double boost of ensuring households have sufficient 
resources while lowering cash flow issues for employers. Policies by the financial 
sector to provide loan repayment holidays are welcome and should give 
households and firms breathing space, but more is required across a range of fixed 
payment items (such as rent, utilities, taxes and other charges).  
 
On the fiscal front, the Government is already taking stimulatory action. While a 
further stimulus will be required at some stage, in the immediate future fiscal 
policy support should be specifically targeted towards income supports and 
measures to help firms remain viable. At present, with Government policy actively 
seeking to discourage people from engaging in unnecessary human contact, 
households are effectively being constrained only to consume bare essentials such 
as basic groceries. This would lower the impact of a broad stimulus now as 
households would have few avenues to spend. However, when the public health 
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phase of the crisis is over, more traditional fiscal policy levers should be engaged 
in an extensive and globally coordinated manner. 
 
During this phase, huge responsibility lies with the European Central Bank (and 
European Banking Authority) as both lender of last resort and financial regulator. 
The ECB has outlined a series of measures which aims to support the supply of 
credit provided by banks to firms and households within the Euro Area. However, 
much more will be needed from the ECB in the weeks and months ahead and it will 
have to act in a ‘whatever it takes’ fashion.  
 
It is clear that sovereign governments across the Euro Area are set to substantially 
increase their levels of debt over the coming months and years in response to this 
crisis. In the domestic context for example, it may be necessary to increase the 
deficit beyond the 4.3 per cent estimated under the present scenario; governments 
must do all that is required to meet the healthcare demands of this crisis. It is 
imperative, therefore, that the ECB does all that it can to prevent this development 
from becoming a full-blown sovereign debt crisis. It must also ensure that 
subsequent debt levels do not impede economic activity across the Euro Area in 
the years to come.  
 
While the ECB is explicitly forbidden from engaging in monetary financing of 
government debt, there are more imaginative ways it can alleviate the fiscal 
burden on member states. For example, Whelan (2020)8 has suggested that the 
ECB could issue very long dated Eurobonds. An announcement could be made 
where it would state that the ECB would purchase substantial quantities of these 
in the secondary market. This would enable governments to fund large deficits. 
These ECB purchases could then be calibrated to keep the yields on newly issued 
Eurobonds low for long periods of time. Alternatively, the ECB could loan money 
to the European Investment Bank which would provide funding to firms in distress. 
Honohan (2020) called for a ‘massive’ expansion of this type of funding.9 
 
From a regulatory perspective, reductions in capital requirements for banks will be 
needed as the Central Bank of Ireland recently announced with its Countercyclical 
Capital Buffer. Creative ways to ensure loan modifications can occur without being 
classed as non-performing in the long run are going to be needed to ensure bank 
lending continues in the recovery phase and a credit crunch does not ensue.  
 
 
 
 
8  https://twitter.com/WhelanKarl/ 
9  https://www.piie.com/commentary/op-eds/coronavirus-no-excuse-repeating-errors-financial-crisis 
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Overall, it is evident that European institutions must learn from some of the 
significant policy mistakes10 which were made in dealing with the financial crisis of 
2007/2008. Coordination and coherence are required across institutions such as 
the European Council (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) and the European Banking Authority (EBA).  
 
 
 
 
10  See McQuinn, K. (2015) for more on this. ‘European fiscal policy during the crisis: An Irish perspective’, Research Note, 
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